As a result of the 2005 reform, pension fund participation in Italy has increased significantly but less than expected moving from 14 up to 24 per cent of the employed workforce. Among others, the lack of financial skills as well as of the knowledge on how public pension system really works might have played a significant role in discouraging potential members. This paper aims at examining whether financial and Social Security literacy do matter in the decision to adhere to a pension fund. Data from a COVIP survey of private sector employees show that people have low financial and Social Security literacy and on average pension plan members have slightly higher literacy than non members. A multivariate analysis offers evidence of a potentially stronger effect of Social Security literacy vis à vis financial literacy on the decision to adhere to pension funds as well as of the importance of country-specific structural issues. These findings may be useful for designing information and awareness campaigns aimed at increasing pension fund participation. JEL Classification: G23; D91; I22; H55.
Introduction
Individuals are increasingly being asked to take decisions for their own retirement wellbeing as a result of shrinking public pensions, and of the shift from defined benefit to defined contributions plans in supplementary private pensions. They are required to make responsible and informed decisions such as: i) the type of pension provider to choose, ii) how much to save for retirement, iii) how to allocate contributions, iv) how to structure the payout phase. A large number of assumptions are embedded in these decisions ranging from the working career (i.e. the career path, the wage profile, the contributions paid into pension funds), to the investment rate of return, the inflation rate and the life expectancy.
People need to be adequately informed in order to understand the consequences of their choices. There is a strict link between knowledge and information on the one hand and decision-making on the other hand. But as many studies have widely documented, lots of workers have poor understanding of Social Security rules and of how much they need to save to achieve their replacement rate goals. Still, they have limited knowledge of some basic financial concepts like compound interest and risk diversification. Moreover, the recent financial turmoil has revealed that many households and investors were unaware or partly unaware of the consequences of their financial decisions due to the lack of knowledge and overconfidence. Illiteracy is generally widespread but some groups are more likely to incur in suboptimal choices (i.e. the poor, the less-educated).
In 2007 Italy has experienced a major reform of its private pension system in order to counterbalance the expected reduction in the replacement rates of public pension system and to raise participation rates that were very low compared with other countries. After the reform, the percentage of the workforce covered by pension funds has increased but less than expected moving from 14 per cent up to 24 per cent.
Among others, the lack of financial skills as well as of the knowledge on how public pension system actually works might have played a significant role in discouraging membership. This paper aims at examining whether financial and Social Security literacy do matter in the decision to adhere to a pension fund in Italy. In mid-2008 COVIP, the national pension funds' supervisory authority, commissioned a survey on a sample of Italian employees in order to investigate the effects of the pension reform on the individuals' pension choices. In the survey, a specific module including some questions on respondents' financial and Social Security literacy was added.
Surveyed people have low financial and Social Security literacy and on average pension plan members have slightly higher literacy than non members. The econometric results of a multivariate analysis offer evidence of a stronger effect of Social Security literacy vis à vis financial literacy on the decision to adhere to pension funds. At the same time, they show that some structural and implementation factors of the reform might have affected the participation rate, especially the size of the employer. Job stability, the level of income, the propensity to save, and the risk aversion seem to be other important determinants. These findings may be useful from a policy perspective, as they may help define priorities in designing information and awareness campaigns.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews briefly prior research on financial and Social Security literacy as well as its relationship with pension fund participation. Section 3 discusses the results of the Italian supplementary private pension reform in terms of participation rates. Section 4 describes the empirical model used to investigate the relationship between literacy and participation and explains the results. Section 5 gives some concluding remarks.
Financial Literacy, Social Security Literacy and Retirement Planning

Financial Literacy
Financial literacy is mainly referred to the "ability to use knowledge and skills to manage financial resources effectively for a lifetime of financial well-being" (US President's Advisory Council on Financial Literacy, 2008) . It can be considered as a part of a broader concept of financial education. OECD provides a comprehensive definition of financial education as "The process by which financial consumers/investors improve their understanding of financial products and concepts and, through information, instruction, and/or objective advice, develop the skills and confidence to become more aware of financial risks and opportunities to make informed choices, to know where to go for help, and to take other effective actions to improve their financial well-being" (OECD, 2005) .
A number of surveys assessing financial literacy have been conducted in the OECD countries as well as in emerging economies. They have documented that a low level of financial awareness and capability generally exists with the more vulnerable groups of people more affected (particularly low-income workers, women, and the least educated).
In the US several studies based on various data sources suggest that a widespread lack of knowledge of some basic financial concepts does exist such as: i) the understanding of the difference between compound and simple interest and of the difference between stocks and bonds; ii) the benefits of portfolio diversification; iii) the importance of planning for retirement (Bernheim, 1998; Hilghert et al., 2003; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007b; Moore, 2003; National Council for Economic Education, 2005) . Some of these have shown a direct relationship between literacy and planning for retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006, 2007a) . The 2009 National Financial Capability Study demonstrated that individuals had low levels of financial capability and the majority of surveyed respondents did not try to figure out their retirement saving needs; this proportion was higher among low income individuals and younger cohorts (FINRA Investor Education Foundation, 2009 ).
In Australia, some studies based on the ANZ Bank's Survey of Adult Financial Literacy report that financial illiteracy is more widespread among young consumers and those with low socioeconomic backgrounds (ANZ Survey, 2008; Worthington, 2006) .
In the UK, the Financial Services Authority commissioned a large survey on financial capability of a representative sample of the UK population in 2005. The published results show that financial capability needs to be improved since too few people understand financial products and plan ahead (Atkinson et al., 2007; Financial Services Authority, 2006) . Other studies find a positive relationship between financial numeracy and knowledge and understanding of pension arrangements (Banks and Oldfield, 2007 ).
In the Netherlands, studies based on the DNB Household Survey provide evidence that financial literacy has a positive effect on stock market participation and also on retirement planning (Alessie et al., 2011; van Rooij et al., 2007 van Rooij et al., , 2008 . Also in Germany the relationship between higher financial literacy and stronger retirement planning behaviour has been supported (Bucher-Koenen and Lusardi, 2011) . In Sweden the link between being financially literate and planning for retirement does exist but it is less strong than in countries mentioned before (Almenberg and Säve-Söderbergh, 2011) .
In Italy the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth shows that respondents lack of financial knowledge, particularly those less educated and residents in the Southern of Italy. Some studies show that financial literacy has a positive and significant impact on pension fund participation (Fornero and Monticone, 2011) while others based on different empirical models do not find statistically significant results supporting this relationship (Cappelletti and Guazzarotti, 2010) . Also the knowledge of some characteristics of pension funds, such as tax incentives and withdrawal rules, seems to be quite limited 1 (Cappelletti and Guazzarotti, 2010) .
If financial illiteracy is so widespread individuals run the risk to incur in financial mistakes and poor decisions about their pension choices (Campbell, 2006; Moore, 2003; Stango and Zinman, 2009) . In this respect, increasing literacy through financial education programs could be welfare-improving. OECD has been playing a prominent role in enhancing attention and visibility to financial education as well as in identifying good practices to make such programs really effective. OECD recommendations regarding financial education and awareness in general were formalized in 2005 while in 2008 a specific set of recommendations related to private pensions was set forth (OECD, 2005 (OECD, , 2008 Smith and Stewart, 2009) . Recently, OECD has promoted the setting-up of the International Network on Financial Education (INFE) and the related website, the International Gateway for Financial Education (IGFE), has been launched. The Gateway aims at exchanging information and experiences worldwide in order to raise people's awareness and ensure the dissemination of research, best practices and guidelines on financial education.
Financial education programs in the field of retirement planning generally range from employer-provided to school-based initiatives. The former consists of written communications explaining retirement savings options, general information about financial markets and economic conditions, and seminars led by in-house staff, pension providers, or third-party experts directed towards employees. School-based programs require that personal financial wellbeing should become part of the basic education of all students.
Are these programs really effective? Most of evidence is based on the US experience. Some studies found that workplace financial education programs have a positive effect on plan participation and retirement accounts (Bayer et al., 2009; Bernheim and Garrett, 2003; Lusardi, 2004) but there is a weak evidence that these programs really increase pension plan participation through improvements in individuals' financial literacy rather than as a result of peer effects (Clark and D'Ambrosio, 2002; Duflo and Saez, 2003; Hira and Loibl, 2005; Kim, 2007) .
School-based financial education programs are common in the US since more than half of states require high schools to teach financial literacy as a stand-alone course. While some studies support the effectiveness of these programs in leading to greater asset accumulation in adulthood (Bernheim et al., 2001 ) others fail to find this relationship (Cole and Shastry, 2009) . Also evidence on the relationship between school-based programs and financial literacy is mixed (Mandell, 2009; Tennison and Nguyen, 2001 ).
Social Security Literacy
Social Security literacy involves the knowledge of how the Social Security system really works, such as the future benefits workers are expected to receive at retirement and the actual date people are entitled to claim pension benefits.
Misunderstanding of the Social Security rules leads people to make suboptimal assessments of their projected retirement needs facing with substantial shortfalls in retirement savings. In deciding how much to save for their supplementary pension plans, individuals try to predict how much they will receive from Social Security. If benefit expectations diverge substantially from realizations workers run the risk of retiring with inadequate resources compared to their needs and may have to postpone retirement or accept lower consumption during that period (Rohwedder and van Soest, 2006) . Additionally, understanding the magnitude of this misperception provides useful information on how best communicate the functioning of the Social Security system to everybody (Liebman and Luttmer, 2009) .
A number of studies have investigated the knowledge of Social Security rules not only in the US but also in Europe (Benitez-Silva et al., 2009; Bernheim, 1988; Dominitz et al., 2002; Greenwald et al., 2010; Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001; Maunu, 2007; Mitchell, 1988; van Duijn et al., 2009; van Els et al., 2003) . The general conclusion of these studies supports the lack of knowledge people do have about Social Security rules.
Some studies analyze the relationship between knowledge and the planning for retirement, finding a correlation between them without implying causality (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005) . Other studies examining the link between social security expectations and financial decisions related to retirement savings suggest that little uncertainty about Social Security benefits makes affordable to take on more investment risk (Delavande and Rohwedder, 2010) . Some analyses based on the Italian experience found that a higher expected replacement rate of the Social Security reduces the probability to invest in a pension fund (Cappelletti and Guazzarotti, 2009; Guiso et al., 2009 ).
In order to improve people's knowledge of Social Security rules, current research suggests that the annual Social Security statement is a successful instrument to convey information on the key features of the Social Security system as well as on the expected pension benefits. In 1995, the US Social Security Administration was required to mail the annual statement to all workers age 60 and from 2000 the statement has been sent to all workers age 25+. Besides to accounting information, the statement provides projections on expected benefits. In Sweden, following a major reform the so-called Orange envelope was introduced in 1999 as a part of a broader campaign to educate people about the pension system. The Orange envelope is sent out annually to all workers providing information on the balance account as well as a projection of pension benefits; additionally, it includes information on how the system actually works 2 .
Studies based on the US experience shown that welfare gains resulting from full information about Social Security rules are higher than those from incomplete information and these gains increase with age. Some of them did not suggest that workers update their behaviour after receiving pension statement (Benitez-Silva, 2009; Mastrobuoni, 2009) , while others find that people provided with more accurate information about future benefits increase their retirement savings (Goda et al., 2012) . Also in Sweden, most people know the contents of the Orange envelope but only a much smaller percentage of them read the entire statement (Sundén, 2009) . Interestingly, the percentage of individuals that looked at a specific section in the Orange envelope is the highest for the information items that are shown first in the pension statement: pension projections are shown on the first page of the Orange envelope.
Other evidence can be found in UK where some analyses shown that the annual pension statement has little or no impact on Social Security knowledge (Bunt and Barlow, 2007) .
However, even in the countries where the annual statement has been playing an important role in increasing people's awareness on the Social Security rules, governments aim at improving the dissemination of information and the methods of communication to workers in order to avoid redundant information and to make the language used as simple as possible (SSAB, 2009; Sunden, 2009 ).
The Private Pension System in Italy after the 2005 Reform
The results
The Italian pension system has been heavily reformed during the last twenty years by modifying the structure of the mandatory first public pension pillar (from a defined benefit earnings-related scheme to a notional defined contribution scheme), while the financing remained on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis (Morcaldo, 2007) .
In 1993, a voluntary tax-favoured second private pension pillar was added to the system in order to counterbalance the expected reduction in the replacement rate of public pensions and to diversify risks.
Ten years later, at the end of 2003, Italian pension funds' members did not exceed 2,6 millions, only about 12 per cent of the employed workforce.
In 2005 the automatic enrolment of private sector employees was implemented by law in order to boost participation rates. The mechanism would be based on the payment of the flow of the severance pay provisions 3 (Trattamento di fine rapporto -TFR) into pension funds. Individual workers would be given a six months period to decide whether to explicitly refuse this arrangement (and consequently the automatic enrolment into pension funds). In this case, for "smaller" firms (with no more than 50 employees 4 ) the TFR would be remained inside them while for "larger" firms (with more than 50 employees) these flows would be transferred to a State fund managed by the Social Security body (INPS). After the first implementation period, the auto-enrolment mechanism would be applied only for workers hired for the first time.
While the opt-out is a reversible choice, the payment of the TFR into pension funds is an irreversible one. For people who do not make an active choice, the TFR will be automatically paid into a less risky default portfolio with guaranteed returns.
Originally, the implementation of the automatic enrolment was planned for the first half of 2008 but in late 2006 the Parliament decided to anticipate it to the first half of 2007.
Net of certain categories, such as short-term and seasonal temporary workers, as well as housemaids, the reform involved about 12.2 million private-sector employed workers, and several hundreds of thousands of companies. At end-2007, around 4,6 million workers were enrolled in supplementary pension plans, or about 20 per cent of all workers, with an increase of 1,4 million compared to end-2006. As expected, the increase was concentrated among the employed workers of the private sector (with an increase of 1,2 million, they reached 3,4 million members at end-2007); only 69,000 employees were automatically enrolled, about 5 per cent of new adhesions.
Overall, the increase was significant, but less than expected compared to other countries in which automatic enrolment was experienced (see Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix). Moreover: i) participation rates continued to be very diverse across sectors and funds -mainly depending on the firm size and the presence of trade unions -reinforcing the differences were already in place before the implementation of auto-enrolment; ii) large differences in participation rates by gender, age groups and regional areas existed before the reform were also confirmed: membership continued to be higher in Northern and Central Italy, among men, and the older workers -and lower in the South and the Islands, among women, and the young. Participation rates continued to be much higher among "stronger" workers, likely to have more stable jobs, higher salaries, and also higher public pensions when they retire; iii) over the next four years, results did not improve so much. At end-2011, total membership was about 5,5 million workers 5 . Moreover, it is worth noting that the bulk of the new adhesions in 2008-11, about 84 per cent of the total, were concentrated in individual insurance-based personal plans -thanks to the effective sales network of insurance companies, while new adhesions to contractual occupational pension funds were limited at about 40,000, with many funds experienced no further growth or even a reduction in membership. Automatic enrolment has been experiencing a limited impact on total membership: those autoenrolled were 140,000, about 5 per cent of the total.
Factors Explaining the Results
Several structural and implementation factors might have contributed to explain the limited success of the reform (Rinaldi, 2011) . First of all, due to high Social Security contribution rates (total -employers' and employees'-stand at 33 per cent of gross wages) it is not clear whether there is room for additional resources to be allocated to pensions. Moreover, in the years following the private pension reform also the Social Security system has been modified. The last 2011 reform has speeded up the mechanism of the automatic link between the retirement age and the life expectancy, the eligibility requirements to get seniority pensions have been tightened up and the differences in the retirement age between males and females progressively removed. As a result, other things equal, the replacement rate coming from the first pillar could increase and this might undermine a further development of the private pension system.
Secondly, the attractiveness of the TFR as a saving vehicle: vis-à-vis conservative investment options. The TFR offers a risk-free rate of return that, although low in nominal terms, is still clearly positive in real terms, in the current low-inflation environment 6 .
Thirdly, the role of the TFR as an important cheap financing source of funds for employers. While larger firms would lost TFR flows no matter the decision of employees, smaller firms would not be neutral vis-à-vis the decision of their employees, because they would keep the TFR of employees refusing to enrol into pension funds as a liability in their balance sheets. Given the tight relations in place within small firms, employers might have influenced the choice of their workers regarding whether or not to enrol.
Finally, the impact of financial and economic crisis although it might not have had an effect on the enrolment in the first half of 2007. The crisis has tightened liquidity constraints for potential members and for smaller firms, and has increased risk aversion, hindering trust in pension plans investing in financial markets 7 .
Besides the structural factors listed above, some implementation factors of auto-enrolment are of major interest. The rescheduling of auto-enrolment one year earlier certainly did not help. Most of the information campaign run by the Ministry of Labour was concentrated in May and June 2007, only the last two months of the semester. Most of contractual pension funds and financial intermediaries offering pension plans fulfilled the requirements for the necessary authorizations only a few weeks before the semester elapsed.
Also the irreversibility of the choice in favour of paying the TFR into the pension funds may have induced uncertainty, anxiety, and procrastination of choice among workers.
The way the "default" option was designed may be seen as an area of a major concern. In case of automatic enrolment, only the TFR is paid into the pension fund, with the deadweight loss of the employers' contribution (usually in the range of 1-1.5 per cent of gross wages depending on labour contracts) -a clearly inferior option for most workers. Additionally, a conservative default portfolio was set up by law: pension funds have to set up sub-funds that guarantee the contributions paid in plus a yield "comparable" to that of the TFR. Taking into account the pressure to keep the costs low, and the historically low interest rates offered by high-quality bonds, this investment profile offers very limited prospects to perform significantly better than the TFR. Moreover, no recognition was given to the different time horizons available to workers of different age, and the selected default option may be considered especially unsuitable for the young.
Summing up both structural and implementation factors may have contributed to the low participation rate in the private pension system. While modifying plan design and rearranging the automatic enrolment could be possible remedial strategies to overcome implementation obstacles, structural factors are consolidated features of the Italian economy that are not easily changeable.
In the next section we investigate if the level of financial and Social Security literacy might be considered as another structural factor explaining the low participation rate after the reform. More in detail, the low level of financial literacy across Italian workers as well as their scarce knowledge of the implications of pension reforms of the Nineties might have discouraged workers to adhere. It is worth noting that since the adoption of the notional defined contribution system for the first pension pillar, workers were not given information on the amount of the annuity that they could reasonably expect to receive: no such a thing as the Swedish Orange envelope has yet been distributed to Italian workers.
A Multivariate Analysis
Data and Methodology
In this section a multivariate analysis is carried out in order to assess if a correlation between financial and Social Security literacy and retirement planning does exist. Our study is a performance test and it is based on objective measures of financial and Social Security literacy rather than subjective ones because we are interested in measuring the actual knowledge and not the perceived knowledge of people or confidence in their knowledge.
Data on financial and Social Security preparedness are drawn from a survey on a sample of Italian private sector employees carried out in May 2008, a few months after the implementation of auto-enrolment and before the blowing up of the financial crisis later in that year. This survey was commissioned by COVIP and conducted by CENSIS in order to understand better the factors influencing workers' choices. To explore financial literacy (FL) a set of specific questions have been added in the survey. The first set of questions regards financial literacy and they are designed similarly to those obtained from other surveys (Lusardi, 2006; 2007c; van Rooij et al. 2007 ). These questions aimed at measuring the ability to perform simple calculations (question FL1), to identify the money illusion phenomenon (question FL2), to know the difference between stocks and bonds (question FL3), to understand the concept of risk diversification (question FL4), to identify correctly the relationship between bond prices and interest rates (question FL5). We are aware that these questions have different degree of difficulty. Question FL1 involves basic mathematical skills while question FL2 deals with the impact of inflation. These two questions measure basic financial knowledge as they mostly require the ability to work with numbers (Hung et al. 2009 ). The other three questions FL3, FL4 and FL5 are more sophisticated implying to some extent a certain degree of knowledge of financial markets and financial instruments like the difference between stocks and bonds, the concept of risk diversification and what happens to bond prices when interest rates rise/fall. To answer correctly to these questions one must have either financial literacy or experience in financial markets 8 . Moreover also the wording of questions does matter. When the lack of financial knowledge is so widespread people might misunderstand the meaning of the questions with a prevalence of random answers 9 .
In addition to the set of questions on financial literacy, three questions about people's knowledge of the Social Security rules (SSL) have been included: these ones ranging from the calculation method of the Social Security benefits (question SSL1), the perception about the expected amount of retirement income compared to the final salary (question SSL2), the financing method of the Social Security system (question SSL3). These questions aimed at investigating how much people incorporate this knowledge in the decision to join/not to join a private pension plan (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2005) . At the time of the survey, in Italy three calculation methods of Social Security benefits applied: i) the earnings-related benefits method, for workers that had at least 18 years of contribution at the end of 1995; ii) the contributions-related benefits method, for workers who are enrolled in the Social Security system after 1995; iii) the mixed benefits method, for workers who had less than 18 years of contributions at the end of 1995 (in this case benefits will be paid according to both an earnings-related method and a contributionsrelated method).
While the question SSL3 allows us to detect the knowledge people actually have on the functioning of the Social Security system, the other two questions might be based on the perception rather than knowledge. In order to address this issue, each respondent were asked to report the starting year of her/his working career. More in details, for each worker we have controlled the pattern of the responses to the first two questions with the entry age in the working career, the latter as a proxy to estimate the length of the contribution period.
Following the old rules, this allows us to gather more actual information about: i) the calculation method that really applies to each worker and ii) the reasonable replacement rate she/he is expected to receive at retirement. Clearly, our assumptions suffer from some drawbacks since they do not consider the individual characteristics of each worker as regards the type of contract (permanent vs. temporary-type), the level of income, the possible interruptions in the contribution period due to spells or unemployment that affect both the entry age in the working career as a proxy of the whole contribution period and the replacement rate she/he is expected to receive as a retiree. Anyway, given the characteristics of our dataset, we think that these assumptions can give a plausible approximation of the actual knowledge of Social Security that respondents had when they were surveyed.
More in detail, the question SSL1, each respondent has been assigned to a specific calculation method according to the entry age to the working career, that is a proxy of her/his actual years of service, in order to identify the public pension regime that really applies.
A similar assumption is applied to the question SSL2 although it is much more complicated. A hypothetical replacement rate is computed for each worker on the basis of the relevant pension legislation at that time and of the average expected retirement age according to the projections carried out by the Department of General Accounts of the Ministry of Economy and Finance in 2009 10 .
When we compute the hypothetical replacement rate for each worker we use point expectations 11 (Bottazzi et al., 2006) : we first look at the expected retirement age or at the combination of the retirement age and contribution period and then we use this information to compute the replacement rate a worker is assumed to receive at retirement on the basis of the pension legislation that would be applied to the respondent, her/his age and the years of contribution at the moment of the survey. The hypothetical replacement rates are then compared with subjective replacement rates as reported in the responses to the question SSL2. It should be noted that replacement rates can be computed with or without tax effects: the former is the gross replacement rate while the latter is the net replacement rate. While the net replacement rate is the more appropriate indicator in terms of disposable income at retirement, people might be less familiar with this rate due to the difficulty in computing the impact of taxes on pensions and income. On the other hand, official projections on the future replacement rates of public pensions are generally disseminated via the mass media referring to the gross replacement rate so people might be more familiar with this rate rather than the net one. In our analysis the hypothetical replacement rate is assumed to be the average between the gross and the net rate that we have computed for each survey's respondent.
Tables 1 reports summary response patterns for financial literacy questions overall and by participation/not participation to a pension plan. Only 50 per cent of respondents answer correctly to the questions regarding numeracy, money illusion, stocks and bonds and risk diversification while a very few people (only 11 per cent) are able to identify the correct relationship between interest rates and bond prices. Don't know (DK) responses are higher for questions FL3, FL4 and FL5. All five questions are answered correctly by only 3 per cent of respondents (27 per cent of respondents could respond correctly at least to three questions). Pension fund members answer correctly more than non members. Also the percentage of DK responses is much lower with respect to non members. Table 2 shows the pattern of responses to the three SSL questions. Answers to question SSL1 show a poor knowledge of the rules applied to future pension benefits: less than 30 per cent have answered well while 46 per cent of responses were incorrect and 25 per cent did not know. Responses to the question SSL2 are controlled by comparing the subjective 10 The main macroeconomic and demographic assumptions behind projections are the following: 1.55 per cent real productivity growth and 1.53 per cent real GDP growth, 2 per cent inflation rate, constant earnings profile. In the contribution-related benefits method and partly in the mixed-benefits method, individual accounts of each worker are transformed into pension benefits according to coefficients that depend on the life expectancy and the retirement age. The Law no. 247 of 2007 established the revision of these coefficients every three years in order to take into account the changes in the longevity. See Department of General Accounts (2009). 11 Other studies use subjective probability distribution of retirement outcomes rather than point expectations. See, among others, Dominitz et al. (2002) .
expectations of the replacement rate with the objective expectations we have hypothesized to be applied to each respondent. Less than 30 per cent of the respondents identified correctly the range of the expected replacement rate at retirement while 30 per cent of them do not know 12 and 40 per cent gave incorrect responses. As far as the question SSL3 is concerned, only 37 per cent of respondents know that contributions paid in today are used to pay current retirees. About 37 per cent fail to identify correctly the functioning of a PAYG system while one fourth of respondents do not know. Similarly to the FL questions, pension fund members answer correctly to the three SSL questions more than non members.
Tables 3 and 4 display financial and Social Security literacy performance by some demographic characteristics. Financial literacy follows a hump-shaped age pattern although the three age groups performance is hardly different. Women perform worse than men while education is highly correlated with financial literacy as 53 per cent of those with a university background answer correctly to at least three questions compared with 40 per cent of those with compulsory education. If we look at Social Security literacy we find again that education is correlated with performance while there are not differences between men and women and young and old age groups perform better than the age class 36-50 probably because in the latter we can easily find people either in the contributions-related benefits method or in the mixed benefits method.
The model
Next we undertake a multivariate analysis in which pension fund's membership as a function of literacy (financial and Social Security) will be investigated controlling for socio demographic variables as well. All financial and Social Security literacy answers have been summarized into three indexes by means of a factor analysis 13 : two financial literacy indexes (FLindex_B and FLindex_N) and the Social Security literacy index (SSLindex), respectively. The two financial literacy indexes reflect the need to distinguish a more comprehensive index (FLindex_B) encompassing all the financial literacy questions included in the survey from a narrower index (FLindex_N) based on the three questions that are consistent with those used in other studies (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011; OECD, 2009 ) such as FL1 (numeracy), FL2 (money illusion) and FL4 (risk diversification).
The respondent either joins (Y=1) or does not (Y=0) a pension plan in the period in which our survey was taken so that:
Where x is a set of explanatory variables and β are parameters reflecting the impact of changes in x on the probability.
12 The fraction of individuals who answered do not know is lower than in other studies because the answer to the question on the expected replacement rate in the survey was solicited with unfolding brackets instead of a unique amount. See Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) . 13 For each question related to the financial literacy we construct a dummy variable indicating which respondents answered the question correctly. We then perform factor analysis on those binary variables using the principal component factor and we retain for each question one factor with eigenvalue > 1: these factors summarize financial literacy; the same approach has been used for Social Security literacy. From these factor loadings we obtain factor scores using the Bartlett method (Bartlett, 1937) that are implemented into our regressions.
Because the dependent variable (pension fund's membership) is binary (i.e. members/non members), we use a probit model of the form:
Where Φ is a commonly used notation for the standard normal cumulative distribution function. If the variable xk is a binary variable, then the marginal effect from changing xk from zero to one, holding all other variables fixed, is:
Where all other variables in the model are set to their means.
Alternatively, in case xk is a continuous variable the marginal effect is:
As Φ is a strictly cumulative distribution function, then g(z) > 0 for all z and the sign of the marginal effect of a change in xk is given by the sign of k β (Woolridge, 2002) .
Therefore, the form of our model is as follows:
where Y is a binary variable indicating that individual is or not a pension fund member and ε is an error term. FLindex and SSLindex represent financial and Social Security literacy index respectively and X is a vector that contains socio-demographic control variables including: age, gender, education, marital status and geographical area of residence.
Z is a vector including factors other than socio-demographic ones that might have played a significant role in determining pension fund membership. The insufficient disposable income has strongly advocated as one of the main constraints individuals have to cope with in joining a pension fund. Since the level of income was not directly surveyed also for avoiding underreporting problems, we would infer the capacity to pay money into pension funds by means of two proxies as follows: i) Job that is a variable taking into account the professional status of each respondent (if she/he is a blue collar, a white collar or a director); ii) Save1, Save2 and Save3 are dummy variables assuming value 1 if the respondent is able to save respectively between 0 and 10 per cent, between 10 and 20 per cent and more than 20 per cent of its annual income.
Another factor which potentially affects the decision to adhere is job security since those with unstable employment are expected to postpone pension plan participation. For instance, Italian youth are over-represented in precarious jobs compared with other EU countries. So we use Permanent as a dummy variable assuming value 1 if a respondent has a permanent labour contract and zero otherwise.
Also the individual's risk aversion is added in our regressions. Since risk-averse individuals may choose to become more literate or to plan for retirement this would influence the relationship between literacy and participation (van Rooij et al., 2008) . Our proxy for risk aversion is the variable Risk assuming value equal to 1 if respondent perceives risks as a dangerous situation needs to be covered and zero otherwise.
Finally, we include the variable Small, that assumes the value equal to 1 if a respondent works for an employer with less than 50 employees and zero otherwise. Intuitively, employers might have an incentive to convince employees not to pay their TFR into pension funds in order to benefit from this cheap self-financing source of funds (Corsini et al., 2010) . The variable TU, equals to one if the respondent is member of trade unions and zero if she/he does not, is also added in order to infer the role of trade unions in encouraging people to join a pension fund. Trade unions play a pivotal role in the system as occupational plans are the result of collective bargaining between social parts and their boards are composed of employer and employee representatives on a paritarian basis. Table 6 reports probit estimates of the effect of financial and Social Security literacy on the decision to join a pension fund. The table displays the marginal effects for 5 different specifications. Most of the independent variables are specified as dummies.
Empirical Findings
The first two regressions aim at examining the relationship between financial literacy and pension fund membership as well as the usual demographic attitudes and some countryspecific structural factors. Columns I and II show both financial literacy indexes play a positive role in encouraging pension plan participation but the results are not statistically significant.
Membership is also positively associated with age but a decreasing rate; the peak in the participation period to a pension fund is reached at 44 years old. It is negatively linked with the residence in the Southern Italy while education does not influence it. When some variables that take into account the capacity to pay money into pension funds, such as the type of job, the propensity to save and the duration of the labour contract are included in our regressions we find most interesting results. Being a white collar worker with a permanent contract is strongly associated with the participation to a pension fund. The higher the propensity to save the stronger the impact on pension fund membership. Participation is significantly affected by the duration of the labour contract: people who have permanent-type contracts are more likely to adhere to a pension fund than those who have temporary-type contracts.
Column III displays the correlation between Social Security literacy and pension plan participation. Membership is strongly and positively associated with Social Security literacy and the results are statistically significant at conventional levels. The marginal effects estimated suggest that a unit increase from Social Security literacy index raises the probability to become a pension fund's member of about 7 per cent.
Columns IV and V combine both financial and Social Security literacy indexes. Social Security literacy is still positively associated with participation whereas financial literacy does not even if the sign remains positive. The results confirm that a correlations exists between Social Security literacy and pension plan participation whereas the relationship with financial literacy is still positive but it is not statistically significant.
Interestingly, risk-averse individuals are expected not to join a pension fund possibly indicating that Italians do perceive supplementary pensions as risky products. This finding is consistent with other studies which demonstrate that risk tolerance increases the likelihood of participating to DC plans (van Rooji et al., 2004) .
A large statistically effect on membership is connected with the employment in a firm with more or less than 50 employees. It is not surprising given the differences in the payment of the TFR according to the size of the employer: if an employee works for a small-sized employer her/his probability to join a pension plan decreases by 12 per cent. Also the union membership is positively associated with membership in such a way to emphasize the potential role that good industrial relations could have in promoting pension fund membership.
It should be noted that our analysis may suffer from causality problem so it is not clear if the association between literacy and pension plan participation can only demonstrate a simple correlation and not causality. In other words, the direction of causality may go from literacy to participation but also from participation to literacy. However, it is worth noting that financial literacy questions seems to be more affected by causality problems rather than Social Security literacy ones as members may become more familiar with financial concepts after their adhesion to a pension fund.
To summarize our analysis emphasizes how important is people's knowledge of the Social Security rules for the development of the second pension pillar. The results strongly confirm the usefulness of Orange-envelope like initiatives in this field as the joint provision of public and private pension projections on future benefits may prove helpful to increase pension awareness and also to raise participation rates. It should be noted that in 2008 a detailed regulation regarding supplementary pension expectations has been issued by COVIP: each pension fund is due to deliver them at the moment of subscription and then every year according to various hypotheses set by the supervisory authority.
Conclusions
In a DC private pension system individuals are responsible for making decisions that will ultimately affect the amount of pension they will receive at retirement. These decisions require them to be informed and to adequately understand the consequences of their decisions. There is abundant evidence that people have poor understanding of Social Security rules and of how much to save for retirement purposes. They have a limited knowledge of some basic and sophisticated financial concepts as well.
A growing number of studies investigated the role of financial literacy in increasing pension fund savings and participation whereas the relationship between participation and Social Security literacy is less analyzed. This paper contributes to the existing literature through a joint investigation on the effects of financial and Social Security literacy on pension fund participation after the recent Italian private pension reform.
The results from a survey on a sample of Italian employees carried out in mid 2008 confirm that people have low financial and Social Security literacy and on average pension plan members have slightly higher literacy than non members. In a next step the answering behaviour is investigated through a multivariate analysis controlling for differences in the socio-economic status as well as some structural factors that are assumed to play a role in explaining current participation rates.
The econometric results show a stronger effect of Social Security literacy vis à vis financial literacy on the decision to adhere to pension funds. This evidence may be a useful finding for policy purposes, as may help define priorities in designing information and awareness campaigns. The results provide with a strong argument for boosting the state of knowledge about Social Security rules and particularly the retirement income one might be entitled to receive from public pension system. In this field, Orange envelope-like initiatives are powerful instruments to promote pension awareness and to provide incentives to pension fund membership.
Our results also show that financial literacy, although positively associated with membership, does not seem to have a statistically significant effect. Nonetheless financial education programs aim at improving how much people are well equipped to make financial choices related to pensions are certainly of great importance even if it might be useful to define programs targeted to more vulnerable groups, such as the young, the poor, the less educated, rather than to all people.
When a limited financial and Social Security literacy exists there is a room for setting appropriate default options that back-up the individual when she/he is unable or unwilling to decide to adhere. Default options are important not only because they gently force individuals to "take" the right decisions, but also as complements to education and information efforts, because they convey information and advice in a simple and effective way 14 .
Finally, our analysis also show some country-specific structural issues, such as the job stability, the level of income, the propensity to save, the risk aversion and particularly the size of the employer, that could have affected the decision to join a pension fund. Their potential role in explaining pension fund participation has to be taken into account in designing future reforms. Marginal effects are calculated at the mean of the continuous variables age and age squared and all the remaining dummy variables set to zero. The marginal effects for the dummy variables are the change in probability given a change from zero to one of the relevant dummy variable. Three stars indicate statistically significant at the 1% confidence level; two stars at the 5% level and one star at the 10% level.
